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Abstract
This article analyzes the dynamic portfolio choice implications of strategic interaction
among money managers. The strategic interaction emerges as the managers compete for
money ﬂows displaying empirically documented convexities. A manager gets money ﬂows
increasing with performance, and hence displays relative performance concerns, if her relative
return is above a threshold; otherwise she receives no (or constant) ﬂows and has no relative
concerns. We provide a tractable formulation of such strategic interaction between two risk
averse managers in a continuous-time setting, and solve for their equilibrium policies in
closed-form. When the managers’ risk aversions are considerably diﬀerent, we do not obtain
a Nash equilibrium as the managers cannot agree on who loses (getting no ﬂows) in some
states. We obtain equilibria, but multiple, when the managers are similar since they now
care only about the total number of losing states. We recover a unique equilibrium, however,
when a suﬃciently high threshold makes the competition for money ﬂows less intense. The
managers’ unique equilibrium policies are driven by chasing and contrarian behaviors when
either manager substantially outperforms the opponent, and by gambling behavior when
their performances are close to the threshold. Depending on the stock correlation, the
direction of gambling for a given manager may diﬀer across stocks, however the two managers
always gamble strategically in the opposite direction from each other in each individual stock.
JEL Classiﬁcations: G11, G20, D81, C73, C61.
Keywords: Money Managers, Strategic Interaction, Portfolio Choice, Relative Perfor-
mance, Incentives, Risk Shifting, Fund Flows, Tournaments.1. Introduction
This paper analyzes the dynamic portfolio strategies of money managers in the presence of
strategic interactions, arising from each manager’s desire to perform well relative to the other
managers. There are several reasons why managers may care about relative performance.
First, given the prevalent ﬁnding in money management that the money ﬂows to relative
performance relationship is increasing and convex (Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and
Tufano (1998)) for individual mutual funds, Gallaher, Kaniel, and Starks (2006) for mutual
fund families, Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2004), Ding, Getmansky, Liang and Wermers
(2007) for hedge funds), a fund manager has incentives to outperform the peers so as to
increase her assets under management, and hence, her compensation.1 Relative concerns
may also arise within fund families as funds with high relative performance are likely to be
advertised more (Jain and Wu (2000)) and also to be cross-subsidized at the expense of other
family members (Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006)). Moreover, money managers may care
about their relative standing due to psychological aspects of human behavior, such as envy
or crave for higher social status.
When discussing the interaction of fund managers in the presence of relative performance
concerns, Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) appeal to the notion of a tournament in which
managers are the competitors and money ﬂows are the prizes awarded based on relative rank-
ing. Since then, a rapidly growing empirical literature (Busse (2001), Qiu (2003), Goriaev,
Nijman, and Werker (2005), Reed and Wu (2005)) address the tournament hypothesis by
looking at how risk taking behavior responds to relative performance. While several recent
theoretical studies attempt to analyze mutual fund tournaments, their results are obtained
under fairly specialized economic settings (as discussed below). To our best knowledge, ours
is the ﬁrst comprehensive analysis of the portfolio choice eﬀects of strategic interactions
within a workhorse dynamic asset allocation framework, allowing us to derive a rich set of
implications. The eﬀects of strategic considerations are likely to be the strongest when there
is a small number of funds competing against each other. One natural real-life case is when
several top-performing funds compete for the leadership. Another example is the strategic
interaction of money managers within a fund family comprised of a small number of funds,
as documented by Kempf and Ruenzi (2008).
We consider two risk averse money managers, interpreted as either mutual fund man-
agers, hedge fund managers, or simply traders.2 We adopt a familiar Merton (1969)-type
1A standard explanation for a positive relation between money ﬂows and relative performance is that
investors respond to widely published fund rankings (MorningStars, Business Week, Forbes, Institutional
Investor) when choosing which fund to invest into.
2In addition to the money management industry, our analysis can also be applied to study the behavior
of traders working in the same investment bank. Indeed, while it may not be explicitly written in a contract,
it is common knowledge that promotion of traders much depends on their relative (to colleagues) success.
Hence, a trader concerned about her career is likely to have relative performance considerations as one of
1continuous-time economy for investment opportunities with multiple correlated risky stocks,
and assume constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences for a normal manager with
no relative performance concerns. We model relative performance concerns by postulating
that a manager’s objective function depends (positively) on the ratio of her horizon invest-
ment return over the other manager’s return, in addition to her own horizon wealth. Our
interpretation for the presence of these relative performance concerns is based on money
ﬂows, which capture the desire of a money manager to attract new money by outperforming
the other manager. We formally justify this in our analysis by considering an option-like
ﬂow-performance speciﬁcation that exhibits a convexity, consistent with the above-cited em-
pirical evidence on fund ﬂows. If the manager’s relative performance is above a certain
threshold, she receives money ﬂows increasing with performance, and hence displays relative
performance concerns. Otherwise if she performs relatively poorly, she receives no (or con-
stant) ﬂows and her objectives are as for a normal manager with no relative concerns. The
presence of the threshold captures inertia whereby investors respond to relative performance
and award a fund with money ﬂows only after this fund outperforms the opponent by a cer-
tain margin (Huang, Wei, and Yan (2007)). In characterizing managers’ behavior, we appeal
to the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium concept, in which each manager strategically accounts
for the dynamic investment policies of the other manager, and the equilibrium policies of
the two managers are mutually consistent.
Solving for the managers’ best responses reveals that a manager only chooses two out-
comes at the horizon: “winning” by outperforming the other manager and attracting ﬂows,
or “losing” by underperforming and getting no ﬂows, and never opting for a “draw.” This
is due to the local convexity around the performance threshold, inducing the manager to
gamble so as to end up either a winner or a loser, thus avoiding a draw. Moreover, we show
that an important feature of a manager when outperforming, and hence displaying relative
performance concerns, is that she either “chases” the opponent, increasing her investment
policy in response to the opponent’s increasing hers, or acts as a “contrarian,” decreasing her
investments in response to the opponents’s increasing hers. In our formulation, a manager
is a chaser if her risk aversion coeﬃcient is greater than unity (more empirically plausible),
and is a contrarian otherwise.
Moving to equilibrium, we demonstrate that the gambling behavior caused by local con-
vexities leads to the potential non-existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, since when
both managers’ performances are close to their thresholds (in the convex region), they cannot
agree on who the winner is. Such a situation occurs when the managers’ attitude towards
risk are considerably diﬀerent, where one manager may want to outperform the other by
just a little to become a winner, while the other manager wants to underperform by a lot
her objectives.
2to be content with being a loser. If on the other hand, the managers’ risk aversions are
suﬃciently similar, an equilibrium obtains, with one manager emerging as a winner and the
other as a loser. However, since the managers are very similar, the opposite outcome may
also occur, where the earlier winner and loser positions are switched, giving rise to multiplic-
ity. We show that both of these non-existence and multiplicity issues are resolved when the
performance threshold is suﬃciently high. This is because with a high threshold, the two
managers cannot both be close to their thresholds and gamble at the same time, which is
the main cause for the non-existence and multiplicity. This unique equilibrium is more likely
to exist for higher values of risk aversions or lower money ﬂow elasticities as this dampens
the gambling incentives.
It is recognized in other economic settings that strategic interactions may lead to out-
comes such as multiplicity or non-existence of equilibrium. However, the economic mech-
anisms and factors determining which of the outcomes occur seem to be speciﬁc to our
framework.3 In particular, we believe that our analysis is the ﬁrst to identify an important
economic role played by the performance threshold and risk aversion heterogeneity in deter-
mining whether unique or multiple equilibrium exists. It is also worth noting that in related
non-strategic works where the gambling behavior is present the optimal portfolios are unique
(Carpenter (2000), Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro (2007)), and hence the possibility of mul-
tiple equilibria or no equilibrium at all is not anticipated in the existing ﬁnance literature.
We discuss the possible multiplicity and non-existence in detail because the client investors
and regulators may ﬁnd these outcomes problematic given the resulting behavior of money
managers.4
When equilibrium is unique, we provide a full characterization of the equilibrium invest-
ment policies. The investments of the two managers at any interim point in time depend on
their performance relative to each other. If a manager signiﬁcantly outperforms the oppo-
nent, both managers are far from the convex region of their objectives and so the chasing and
contrarian behaviors dominate the gambling incentives. In particular, when outperforming a
chaser moves her investment policy towards the opponent’s normal policy, while a contrarian
tilts her policy away from the opponent’s normal policy. For the underperforming manager,
the relative concerns are weak since the likelihood of her attracting money ﬂows at year-end
is low, and hence her equilibrium policy is close to the normal policy. When both managers’
3In other words, the important question of when multiplicity or non-existence occurs cannot be addressed
by relying on the intuition or formal conditions developed in other strategic settings where these features
are also present. For example, given the complexity of our framework it does not appear possible to check
whether the conditions for existence (Baye, Tian, and Zhou (1993)) or multiplicity (Cooper and John (1988))
of pure-strategy equilibrium are satisﬁed in our setting.
4Indeed, if pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist the managers are likely to resort to mixed strategies,
implying that investor returns are subject to an additional randomness on top of the stock price uncertainty.
Under multiplicity, investors cannot reliably predict their returns for a given realization of stock prices, which
again implies the presence of an additional risk.
3performance is close to the threshold, the gambling incentives dominate the chasing and
contrarian behaviors, inducing the two managers to gamble in the opposite direction from
each other in each individual stock. The exact direction of a manager’s gambling in each
stock is determined by the relation between the managers’ risk aversions and the Sharpe
ratios of the risky stocks.
Considering a setting with two risky stocks and looking at the eﬀect of stock correlation,
we show that the managers’ policies are driven by the interaction of a diversiﬁcation eﬀect,
the extent of beneﬁts to diversiﬁcation, and a substitution eﬀect, the extent of the stocks
acting as a substitute to each other. A higher stock correlation reduces the diversiﬁcation
beneﬁts and so the managers tend to decrease their investments in both stocks. As the
correlation increases further, the substitution eﬀect kicks in leading to a decrease in the
managers’ investments in the less favorable stock (with a relatively low Sharpe ratio) and
an increase in the more favorable stock (with a relatively high Sharpe ratio). As a result,
the managers’ investments in the more favorable stock are non-monotonic in correlation.
Moreover, as the substitution eﬀect grows stronger for high correlation values, each manager
strategically changes the direction of gambling in the less favorable stock in order to amplify
the gambling in the opposite direction in the more favorable stock.
Above equilibrium investments determine whether a manager ends up as a winner or as
a loser at the investment horizon depending on economic conditions. In good states, the
more risk averse manager performs worse (consistent with normal behavior) and hence is a
loser, while the less risk averse manager with the better performance is a winner, getting the
money ﬂows. In bad states, the opposite holds, with the more risk averse manager emerging
as the winner, and the less risk averse as the loser. In intermediate states, around their
performance thresholds, both managers are losers, not getting any ﬂows. Multiple equilibria
obtains when the performance threshold is low, which rules out the unique equilibrium
outcome of both managers being losers in intermediate states. Each manager now wants to
diﬀerentiate herself from the opponent, and so both outcomes, with either manager being a
winner and the other a loser, constitute a (multiple) equilibrium. The reason why a manager
may be content with being a loser in a certain state is that choosing a relatively low wealth
and losing in that state allows the manager to choose a relatively high wealth and win in
another state. In good and bad states the multiple equilibrium outcomes are as in the unique
equilibrium.
Our paper is related to several strands of literature. First is the literature on the eﬀects
of strategic considerations on portfolio managers’ choices. Most of these works adopt single-
or two-period settings and often assume risk neutrality (Goriaev, Palomino and Prat (2003),
Taylor (2003), Palomino (2005), Li and Tiwari (2005), Chiang (1999), Loranth and Sciubba
(2006)). Our goal is to characterize optimal portfolios in a standard dynamic asset allocation
4setting with risk averse managers. We ﬁnd risk aversion to be the critical driving factor
in much of our analysis, including chasing/contrarian behavior, risk shifting, existence of
equilibrium. In a dynamic setting like ours, Browne (2000) investigates a portfolio game
between two managers. He primarily focuses on the case when the managers face diﬀerent
ﬁnancial investment opportunities and have practical objectives (maximizing the probability
of beating the other manager, minimizing the expected time of beating the other manager).
None of these objective functions display local convexities, which we ﬁnd to have important
implications for equilibrium investment policies as well as for the number of equilibria.
If a peer group consists of a large number of competing funds, strategic interactions
are likely to be less pronounced. In this case, the behavior of each fund manager is better
described by assuming that she seeks to perform well relative to an exogenous benchmark.
The manager’s behavior in this case has been recently investigated in Basak, Shapiro, and
Tepla (2006), van Binsbergen, Brandt, and Koijen (2007), Cuoco and Kaniel (2007). Several
works, including Carpenter (2000), Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro (2007), have demonstrated
that convexities in managers’ objective functions have signiﬁcant implications for the optimal
portfolios, leading to risk shifting behavior. We contribute to this literature by investigating
how the risk shifting motives interact with strategic considerations and recover novel eco-
nomic implications. First, strategic interactions can lead to non-existence or multiplicity of
equilibrium. Second, the economic mechanism behind the chasing and contrarian behavior,
which drives the equilibrium policies across the whole range of relative performance apart
from the gambling region, is not present in the above non-strategic studies. Third, our two
managers always gamble in the opposite direction from each other in each individual stock,
and it is the manager’s risk aversion relative to that of the opponent that determines the
direction of gambling. This is notably diﬀerent from the related works which ﬁnd that the
direction of gambling is either determined by the absolute value of the manager’s risk aver-
sion or is always the same. Fourth, we reveal that changing the correlation between risky
stock returns leads to rich patterns in the behavior of strategic managers, which are not
present in the existing non-strategic works.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature that examines the role of relative wealth
concerns in ﬁnance. DeMarzo, Kaniel, and Kremer (2007, 2008) show that relative wealth
concerns may play a role in explaining ﬁnancial bubbles and excessive real investments.
These papers are close in spirit to our work since they also demonstrate how relative wealth
concerns may arise endogenously. However, their mechanism for the emergence of relative
concerns is a general equilibrium one, and so is notably diﬀerent from ours. In DeMarzo et al.,
there is a scarce consumption good whose price increases with the cohort’s wealth, implying
that an investor’s relative wealth determines the quantity of the good she can aﬀord. Abel
(1990), Gomez, Priestley, and Zapatero (2008), among many others, demonstrate that models
with the “catching-up-with-the-Joneses” feature can explain various empirically observed
5asset pricing phenomena. Goel and Thakor (2005) investigate how envy leads to corporate
investment distortions.
Remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the economic set-
up and provides the money ﬂows justiﬁcation for relative performance concerns. Section 3
describes the managers’ objective functions and characterizes their best responses. Section
4 analyzes the issues of non-existence, uniqueness, and multiplicity of equilibrium. Section
5 characterizes the unique and multiple equilibrium and investigates the properties of the
equilibrium investment policies. Section 6 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
2. Economy with Strategic Asset Allocation
2.1. Economic Set-Up
We adopt a familiar dynamic asset allocation framework along the lines of Merton (1969). We
consider a continuous-time, ﬁnite horizon [0,T] economy, in which the uncertainty is driven
by an N-dimensional standard Brownian motion ω = (ω1, ...,ωN)⊤. Financial investment
opportunities are given by a riskless bond and N correlated risky stocks. The bond provides
a constant interest rate r. Each stock price, Sj, follows a geometric Brownian motion
dSjt = Sjt jdt + Sjt
N  
k=1
σjkdωkt, j = 1,...,N,
where the stock mean returns   ≡ ( 1,..., N)⊤ and the nondegenerate volatility matrix
σ ≡ {σjk, j,k = 1,...N} are constant,5 and the (instantaneous) correlation between stock









Each money manager i in this economy dynamically chooses an investment policy φi,
where φit ≡ (φi1,...,φiN)⊤ denotes the vector of fractions of fund assets invested in each
stock, or the risk exposure, given initial assets of Wi0. The investment wealth process of
manager i, Wi, follows
dWit = Wit[r + φ
⊤
it(  − r¯ 1)]dt + Witφ
⊤
itσdωt, (1)
where ¯ 1 = (1,...,1)⊤. Dynamic market completeness (under no-arbitrage) implies the
existence of a unique state price density process, ξ, with dynamics dξt = −ξtrdt − ξtκ⊤dωt,
5While it may be of interest to consider a more general setting with a stochastic investment opportunity
set, the analytical tractability in the current framework would be lost (as would also be the case for non-
strategic models). To characterize the dynamic equilibrium portfolio policies in such a setting, one would
need to resort to numerical methods, such as those proposed by Detemple, Garcia, and Rindisbacher (2003)
and Cvitanic, Goukasian, and Zapatero (2003). We leave this for future work.
6where κ ≡ σ−1(  − r¯ 1) is the constant N-dimensional market price of risk in the economy.
The state-price density serves as the driving economic state variable in a manager’s dynamic
investment problem absent any market imperfections. The quantity ξt(ω) is interpreted as
the Arrow-Debreu price per unit probability P of one unit of wealth in state ω ∈ Ω at time
t. In particular, each manager’s dynamic budget constraint (1) can be restated as (e.g.,
Karatzas and Shreve (1998))
E[ξTWiT] = Wi0. (2)
This allows us to equivalently deﬁne the set of possible investment policies of managers as
being the managers’ horizon wealth, WiT, subject to the static budget constraint (2).
2.2. Modeling Strategic Interaction
We envision a money manager, interpreted either as a mutual fund manager, a hedge fund
manager or a trader, who seeks to increase the terminal value of her portfolio. This is
consistent with maximizing her own compensation given the widespread use of the linear
fee structure in the money management industry. The key feature of our setting is that
the manager experiences money ﬂows which depend on her relative performance within a
peer group – we formalize this idea below. In this paper, we look at the scenario when all
fund managers within this peer group have relative performance concerns driven by money
ﬂows, leading to the strategic interaction among the managers. We expect the eﬀects of
such interaction to be most pronounced when the peer group is comprised of a small number
of funds. In this case, each manager is a major player in the competition for money ﬂows
implying that her decisions may signiﬁcantly aﬀect the other managers’ actions. One natural
real-life example is when the few very top funds attempt to become year-end top-performers.
Another example is the competition of fund managers within fund families. Kempf and
Ruenzi (2008) document the presence of strategic interactions in families that are comprised
of a small number of funds.
In the presence of relative concerns, the objective function of manager i has the general
form
vi(WiT,RiT), (3)
where vi is increasing in horizon wealth, WiT, and horizon relative return, RiT. We consider
a framework with two fund managers, indexed by i = 1,2. The relative returns of managers
1 and 2, R1T and R2T, capture the relative performance concerns and are deﬁned as the ratio








7We normalize both managers’ initial assets to be equal, W10 = W20, without loss of generality
(see Remark 3).
We now provide a rational justiﬁcation for the objective function (3) by showing that it
arises naturally in a setting where managers care directly only about their own wealth and
that its speciﬁc form used in this paper corresponds to the empirically observed fund-ﬂows to
relative performance relation. Towards this, the economic setting is extended as follows. The
manager continues to invest beyond date T up until an investment horizon T ′. Motivated by
the empirical evidence for both mutual funds and hedge funds (Chevalier and Ellison (1997),
Sirri and Tufano (1998), Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2004), Ding, Getmansky, Liang and
Wermers (2007)), we assume that the manager experiences money ﬂows at a rate fT. The
ﬂow-performance relationship fT is (weakly) increasing and convex in the manager’s relative
performance over the period [0,T], with fT > 1 denoting an inﬂow and fT < 1 an outﬂow.
The manager’s investment horizon T ′ (e.g., expected tenure, compensation date), of course,
need not coincide with the money ﬂows date T (e.g., quarter- or year-end). So, the objective
function (3) is interpreted as the manager’s indirect utility of post-ﬂows horizon wealth.6
Manager i, i = 1,2, is assumed to have CRRA preferences deﬁned over the overall value




1 − ¯ γi
, ¯ γi > 0,¯ γi  = 1. (5)
Chevalier and Ellison (1997) document that for top-performing mutual funds the ﬂow-
performance relation is roughly ﬂat until a certain threshold and then increases sharply.
Similarly, Ding, Getmansky, Liang, and Wermers (2007) ﬁnd that for a certain group of
hedge funds, comprised to a large extent of top-performers, the ﬂows sensitivity shoots up
in the region of high past performance.7 Based on this, we consider a ﬂow-performance
relation that resembles the convex payoﬀ proﬁle of a call option – it is ﬂat until a cer-
tain performance threshold η and then increases with relative performance – given by fT =
k
1{RiT <η} + k(RiT/η)α
1{RiT ≥η}. In this speciﬁcation, α denotes the ﬂow elasticity, the elas-
ticity of money ﬂows with respect to manager’s relative performance when it is above the
6Alternatively, the objective speciﬁcation (3) could be interpreted as capturing the well-known psycholog-
ical feature that people care about their relative standing in the society or in their profession. Furthermore,
we note from (3) that a manager only cares about her relative performance at the investment horizon T,
even though when choosing a fund some client investors may additionally take into account the relative
performance at interim dates. We do not incorporate such a feature in our model in order to better reﬂect
the prevailing view that ”the most critical rankings are based on annual performance” (Brown, Harlow, and
Starks (1996)).
7While Ding et al. ﬁnd a linear relationship between ﬂows and past performance for the universe of hedge
funds, they document a convex relationship once they look at the so-called defunct database. One of the
main reasons why a hedge fund becomes defunct is when it had an exceptionally good past performance and,
as a result, no longer needs to advertise itself to potential investors by reporting the information to data
vendors. Given that we focus on top-performing hedge funds, this evidence supports our assumption that
the ﬂow-performance relation is convex.
8performance threshold η. The parameter k reﬂects the idea that a manager, being a top-
performer, is likely to experience money inﬂows even when her relative performance is below
the threshold η. This feature can be captured by setting k > 1. The performance threshold
η ≥ 1 captures the potential inertia of individual investors who do not respond to relative
performance unless a manager outperforms the opponent by a certain margin. The case of
η = 1 corresponds to the absence of inertia, where investors immediately reward manager
i with money ﬂows once her performance RiT exceeds that of the opponent. The stronger
the inertia the higher the performance threshold η. For completeness, we comment on the
case of η < 1 in Remark 1. It should be noted that the presence of the inertia does not
imply any sort of investors’ irrationality. On the contrary, Huang, Wei, and Yan (2007)
formally show that performance thresholds endogenously arise when rational investors face
information acquisition costs or transaction costs.8
The original optimization problem of maximizing the expected value of (5) is equivalent




subject to the dynamic budget constraint (1) for t ∈[T,T ′], given the time-T assets value
augmented by money ﬂows, WiTfT. Lemma 1 presents the time-T indirect utility function
for our ﬂow-performance speciﬁcation.
Lemma 1. For the ﬂow-performance function fT = k
1{RiT<η} + k(RiT/η)α
1{RiT ≥η}, α > 0,























γi = ¯ γi + α(¯ γi − 1), (8)
with the properties that θ ∈ [0,1), γi > ¯ γi if and only if ¯ γi > 1.
Lemma 1 provides a rational justiﬁcation for managers’ having relative performance con-
8A real-life example of the use of thresholds is provided by the following description of the investment
strategy of DAL Investment Company with 2 billion under management: “We rank them [mutual funds]
based on the average performance ... Then we review the rankings to select the funds that are in the top 10%
of their risk category for the portfolio. We have speciﬁc sell thresholds, and when they reach the threshold,
we replace them with the current leaders.”
9cerns, and quantiﬁes the link between the shape of the ﬂow-performance relation and the
parameters of the manager’s objective function. When the manager performs relatively
poorly, she gets performance-insensitive money ﬂows, and so inherits the objectives of a nor-
mal manager with no relative performance concerns. When the manager’s relative return is
above the performance threshold however, she gets money ﬂows increasing with performance,
and hence displays relative concerns, with the parameter θ capturing the manager’s relative
performance bias, the extent to which she biases her objectives towards relative performance
concerns. The special case of θ = 0 (or equivalently α = 0) corresponds to a normal man-
ager. From (6), we also observe that the manager’s attitude towards risk changes in the
presence of money ﬂows. Indeed, while ¯ γi represents the manager’s intrinsic risk aversion




iT) in the presence of relative performance concerns.9 Moreover, the man-
ager’s attitude towards risk is increased (γi > ¯ γi) by the presence of money ﬂows (α > 0)
for intrinsic risk aversions greater than unity (¯ γi > 1), and is decreased for intrinsic risk
aversions less than unity.
We note that for our subsequent maximization problems to be well-deﬁned, we will assume
that the indirect utility function (6) is concave in the region RiT ≥ η. This is true if and only
if ¯ γi > 1−1/(1+α), which always holds for a relatively risk averse manager ¯ γi > 1. We also
note that a local convexity in our ﬂow-performance speciﬁcation leads to a local convexity
in the resulting objective function (6), which will be shown to have important implications
for many of our results. In addition to the fact the local convexities arise endogenously for
a realistic ﬂow-performance speciﬁcation, Koijen (2008) provides an alternative supporting
evidence for the presence of convexities in managers’ objective functions. He derives the
optimal portfolios of mutual fund managers for several diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the objective
function and then uses the portfolio data to back out the managers’ risk aversions implied by
each speciﬁcation. Koijen uncovers that the only speciﬁcation leading to plausible estimates
of risk aversion is the one featuring local convexities.
2.3. Nash Equilibrium Policies
In this paper, we appeal to the Nash equilibrium notion to characterize managers’ behavior
in their strategic interaction via relative performance concerns.10 In what follows, we assume
9The diﬀerence between the two risk aversion parameters stems from the fact that manager i assesses a
gamble (WiT +ǫ, WiT −ǫ) diﬀerently in cases with and without money inﬂows. In the latter case, ǫ represents
an actual change in wealth . In the former case, changing wealth by ǫ leads to money in- or outﬂows and so
eﬀectively the manager faces a diﬀerent gamble.
10As we employ the concept of Nash equilibrium, we assume that the managers act non-cooperatively. In
principle, it is possible that other types of behavior, such as herding (Scharfstein and Stein (1990)), can
take place. However, the empirical literature largely fails to ﬁnd evidence of herding among fund managers
(Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995), Dass, Massa, and Patgiri (2008)).
10that managers have common knowledge of the ﬂow-performance relation and each other’s
objectives, in particular attitude towards risk ¯ γi. In reality, an average fund manager may
not know precisely her peers’ risk aversions. However, this seems to be less of a concern in
our setting given that we focus on the very top managers. Indeed, their portfolio strategies
are often in the spotlight attracting a lot of attention from the analysts and ﬁnancial media.
Moreover, the managers’ risk aversions can be estimated from the past performance data,
as demonstrated by Koijen (2008). In order to deﬁne a Nash equilibrium, we ﬁrst introduce
the best response policies. Throughout the paper, a symbol with a hatˆdenotes an optimal
best response quantity, while one with an asterisk ∗ denotes an equilibrium quantity.
Deﬁnition 1. For a given manager 2’s dynamic policy φ2, manager 1’s best response ˆ φ1 is




subject to dW1t = W1t[r + φ
⊤
1t(  − r¯ 1)]dt + W1tφ
⊤
1tσdωt.
Similarly, for a given manager 1’s dynamic policy φ1, manager 2’s best response ˆ φ2 is the




subject to dW2t = W2t[r + φ
⊤
2t(  − r¯ 1)]dt + W2tφ
⊤
2tσdωt
Deﬁnition 2. A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is a pair of investment policies (φ∗
1t, φ∗
2t,
t ∈ [0,T]) such that:
(i) φ∗
1 is manager 1’s best response to φ∗
2,
(ii) φ∗
2 is manager 2’s best response to φ∗
1.
In a Nash equilibrium, each manager strategically accounts for the actions of the other
manager, and the pure-strategy equilibrium policies of the two managers are mutually con-
sistent. As discussed previously, in our set-up, for a given horizon wealth WiT satisfying
the budget constraint (2) there exists a unique portfolio policy φit, t ∈ [0,T], replicating it.
Hence, for an equilibrium outcome in investment policies (φ∗
1t, φ∗
2t, t ∈ [0,T]), there is always
an equivalent outcome in terms of horizon wealth policies (W ∗
1T,W ∗
2T). We make use of this
duality by solving for the equilibrium horizon wealth, and then deriving the corresponding
equilibrium investment policies. As the subsequent analysis demonstrates, the equilibrium
horizon wealth proﬁles do not depend on time. Hence, the managers’ equilibrium investment
policies are time-consistent.11
11To solve for equilibrium, we conjecture that the managers’ equilibrium horizon wealth proﬁles are ﬁxed
functions of the state variable ξT. It is then straightforward to verify that the resulting equilibrium strategies
113. Managers’ Objectives and Best Responses





















as given by Lemma 1, where η ≥ 1 is the performance threshold, and manager 2’s ob-
jective function is as in (11) with subscripts 1 and 2 switched. Here, the convexity of
ﬂow-performance relation leads to an asymmetric perception of outperformance and under-
performance by the manager, whereby only the former aﬀects her normal objectives.12 For
ease of discussion, we henceforth refer to the manager with a below-threshold performance
as not getting any ﬂows (instead of getting constant ﬂows), since all our subsequent results
are not aﬀected by the magnitude of constant ﬂows k (Propositions 1–4).
Before proceeding with the formal analysis, we provide some basic intuition regarding how
the optimal horizon wealth of manager 1 may be aﬀected by manager 2’s choice of horizon
wealth in the presence of relative performance concerns when outperforming (W1T ≥ ηW2T).
Suppose that manager 2’s horizon wealth increases. This has the following two eﬀects on
manager 1. First, higher manager 2’s wealth implies lower money ﬂows for manager 1. As
a result, manager 1 wants to increase her wealth so as to restore the previous level of ﬂows.
Second, higher W2T reduces the incremental eﬀect of a unit change in manager 1’s wealth,
making it costlier for manager 1 to increase her wealth. In the pivotal logarithmic case
(γ1 = 1), the two eﬀects exactly oﬀset each other. For a relatively risk averse manager,
γ1 > 1, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates and manager 1 increases her wealth W1T. For a relatively
risk tolerant manager, γ1 < 1, the second eﬀect dominates and manager 1 decreases her
wealth. Note that for γ1 > 1, manager 1’s response essentially means that manager 1 is
chasing manager 2. On the other hand, for γ1 < 1 manager 1 is a contrarian to manager
2. Chetty (2006), in diﬀerent economic settings, and Koijen (2008), speciﬁcally for fund
managers, document a substantial heterogeneity in the estimates of relative risk aversion,
which suggests that both types of behavior – chasing and contrarian – are likely to be present
in our money management context. The latter study also ﬁnds the average risk aversion of
fund managers to be above unity, implying that one can expect the average real-life manager
to be a chaser.
will also constitute an equilibrium if the managers can choose path-dependent wealth proﬁles. It remains
to be investigated whether there are other equilibria with path-dependent wealth proﬁles, in which case
time-consistency is not ensured.
12An alternative psychological interpretation is that that such an asymmetry can be due to the well-
documented fact that people tend to attribute their success to skill and failure to bad luck (Zuckerman
(1979)).
12To highlight further features of the objective function (11), we plot in Figure 1 its typical






risk aversion ¯ γ1
Figure 1: Manager 1’s objective function.
ing on manager 1’s relative performance at the horizon T, or equivalently on the relation
between manager 1’s wealth and the threshold level ηW2T. When her wealth is above the
threshold, the manager gets money ﬂows, and hence we label her as the winner. In this case,
she is in the region of objectives augmented by relative performance concerns, driven by her
eﬀective risk aversion γ1. When manager 1’s wealth is below the threshold, she does not get
money ﬂows, and so is labelled as the loser. In this case, the manager ﬁnds herself in the
region of normal objectives with no relative performance concerns, driven by her intrinsic
risk aversion ¯ γ1. Finally, when the performance is around the threshold level, the manager
is in the region of local convexity. Consequently, there are two main diﬀerences from the
conventional CRRA objective function. The ﬁrst is that now both intrinsic and eﬀective
risk aversions directly enter the objective speciﬁcation, and thus have distinct eﬀects on the
optimal policies. The second, and a major, diﬀerence is the presence of the local convexity in
(11) which, as established in the existing literature (Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro (2007) and
Carpenter (2000)), leads to risk shifting behavior. We show that such convexities coupled
with strategic interactions can result in multiple equilibria or no pure-strategy equilibrium.
Given the novelty of these phenomena, we provide a detailed analysis of the economic condi-
tions under which they may occur in the next Section 4. In Section 5, we fully characterize
the equilibrium policies when an equilibrium (unique or multiple) exists and also investigate
the eﬀects of various parameters on the equilibrium policies.
We now determine the managers’ best responses. The managers’ optimization problems
are non-standard since their objective functions are not globally concave. Nevertheless,
interior solutions turn out to exist since the managers’ risk aversions limit the sizes of their
gambles over the locally convex regions. In Proposition 1 we report the managers’ best
responses explicitly in closed form.
















θ(γ2−1)/γ2 y2ξT ≤ b2(ηW1T) (winner), (15)
where the boundary functions bi( ) are given by
bi(W) = (1 + α)
¯ γi/θ (¯ γi/γi)
¯ γiγi/(γi−¯ γi) W
−¯ γi (16)
and yi > 0 solves E[ξT ˆ WiT] = Wi0,i = 1,2. Moreover, when manager i is a winner, her
associated relative performance ˆ RiT is bounded from below by the minimum outperformance
margin, ¯ ηi, given by ¯ ηi = (1 + α)−1/α(¯ γi/γi)−¯ γi/(γi−¯ γi)η > η. When manager i is a loser, her
relative performance ˆ RiT is bounded from above by the maximum underperformance margin,
η
i, given by η
i = (1 + α)−(1+α)/α(¯ γi/γi)−γi/(γi−¯ γi)η < η.
Focusing on manager 1, she chooses whether to be a winner or a loser depending on the
level of the threshold wealth, ηW2T, relative to the cost of wealth in that state, ξT, where
the threshold wealth aﬀects manager 1 through the decreasing boundary function b1( ). For
a relatively low threshold wealth (low manager 2’s wealth or performance threshold), man-
ager 1 optimally becomes a winner, outperforming the threshold ηW2T, in which case her
best response (13) is given by by a normal policy, (y1ξT)−1/γ1, augmented by the component
W
θ1(γ1−1)/γ1
2T , accounting for relative performance concerns. The additional component for-
malizes the basic intuition oﬀered previously. When a chaser (γ1 > 1), manager 1 increases
her optimal wealth in response to manager 2’s increasing hers. Vice versa, if a contrarian
(γ1 < 1), manager 1 decreases her wealth in response to manager 2’s increasing hers. Other-
wise, for a relatively high threshold wealth, manager 1 opts to be a loser, in which case her
best response (12) follows the normal policy.
An important feature here is that a manager only considers two outcomes: winning or
losing, never opting for a “draw” by choosing her relative performance ˆ RiT to be equal or
close to the threshold η. This is due to the convexity of her the objective function around the
threshold, inducing her to gamble so as to end up either a winner or a loser, thus avoiding
a draw. As presented in Proposition 1, formally, there exists a manager-speciﬁc minimum
outperformance margin ¯ ηi, greater than η, so that a winner’s relative performance can never
be below this margin. Similarly, there is a maximum underperformance margin η
i, less than
η, so that a loser’s relative performance can never be above this margin.
144. Existence and Uniqueness of Pure-Strategy
Equilibrium
As we demonstrate below, the managers’ risk-shifting motives, together with their strategic
interaction, may prevent an equilibrium to occur. In this Section, we investigate the under-
lying economic mechanisms and establish the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of
a Nash equilibrium.
To ﬁnd a Nash equilibrium, we look for mutually consistent best responses of the two
managers. Since for a given state of nature, represented by a realization of ξT, a manager is
either a winner or a loser, there are four possibilities for an equilibrium with two managers.
However, both managers cannot be winners as the performance threshold η is greater or equal
to 1, and so at most one manager can get money ﬂows. Hence, for each ξT there are three
possible Nash equilibrium outcomes, denoted by (manager 1 outcome, manager 2 outcome):
(winner, loser), (loser, winner), or (loser, loser). Note that the condition for the (loser, loser)
outcome is 1/η < W1T/W2T < η, which is only possible if η > 1. A Nash equilibrium exists
if the three possible outcomes fully cover the interval (0,+∞), which represents all possible
states of the world ξT. There are multiple equilibria whenever any two intervals of ξT over
which two outcomes occur overlap, meaning that for some ξT the outcome is not uniquely
deﬁned.
The existence of an equilibrium, however, is not always possible in this setting. To see
how non-existence may arise, assume for ease of exposition that the performance threshold
η equals one, ruling out the potential (loser, loser) outcome. Consider a situation when
manager 1’s minimum outperformance margin ¯ η1 is close to one (her relative performance
has to exceed ¯ η1 for winning (Proposition 1)), while manager 2’s maximum underperformance
margin η
2 is much lower than one (her relative performance has to be below η
2 for losing). In
this situation, in some states manager 1 may want to outperform manager 2 by just a little,
while manager 2, whenever she decides to be a loser, wants to underperform by a lot. Hence,
the managers cannot agree on the winning/losing margin, resulting in the non-existence of
equilibrium.
This non-existence issue would be resolved if the two managers had (suﬃciently) similar
risk aversions, and hence similar performance margins. Indeed, an equilibrium would now
exist because the winner’s outperformance margin ¯ η1 is consistent with the loser’s underper-
formance margin η
2. However, if in a certain state of the world the outcome with manager
1 a winner and manager 2 a loser constitutes an equilibrium, the opposite outcome is also
likely to be an equilibrium as the managers are (almost) symmetric – in other words, the
multiplicity of equilibrium arises. Intuitively, since each manager is aware of her own and
the other’s budget constraint, a manager is indiﬀerent between being a winner and a loser
15in a particular state since choosing a relatively low wealth (being a loser) in one state will
allow her to have a relatively high wealth (be a winner) in another state.
Proposition 2 formalizes the discussion above by providing conditions on the model’s
parameters for the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium.
Proposition 2.





















(iii) if neither (17) nor (18) is satisﬁed, there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
In the above, the constants A,B,C,D are given by
A = (1 + α)
−¯ γ1¯ γ2/θ (¯ γ1/γ1)
−¯ γ1γ1¯ γ2/(γ1−¯ γ1) ,B = (1 + α)
¯ γ1¯ γ2/θ (¯ γ2/γ2)
¯ γ1γ2¯ γ2/(γ2−¯ γ2) , (19)
C = (1 + α)
γ1¯ γ2/θ−¯ γ2 (¯ γ2/γ2)
γ1γ2¯ γ2/(γ2−¯ γ2) ,D = (1 + α)
¯ γ1−γ2¯ γ1/θ (¯ γ1/γ1)
−¯ γ1γ1γ2/(γ1−¯ γ1) . (20)
Proposition 2 reveals that a unique equilibrium occurs when the performance threshold η
is above a certain critical value.13,14 As discussed, the non-existence arises when a potential
equilibrium is destroyed by a loser who, after observing that the winner’s performance is
only slightly higher, increases her performance in an attempt to become the winner. When
η increases, it is less likely that the loser would try to become the winner, since it would
require a larger increase in performance. As for the multiplicity, it occurs when in some
states the managers may switch their ranking, with the winner becoming the loser, and vice
versa. When the performance threshold is high, both managers optimally choose to be losers
in some states of the world. In this case, the mechanism behind multiplicity – switching
rankings – does not work since the rankings are the same, and so the unique equilibrium
13To see that the unique- and multiple-equilibria conditions, (17) and (18), cannot hold simultaneously,
note that from (17) it follows that η > (B/A)
1/(2¯ γ1¯ γ2), or equivalently, Aη¯ γ1¯ γ2 > Bη−¯ γ1¯ γ2, while (18) implies
that Aη¯ γ1¯ γ2 < Bη−¯ γ1¯ γ2, contradicting (17).
14When the performance threshold η is equal (or close) to 1, the outcome (loser, loser) cannot happen in
equilibrium. Hence, for an equilibrium to exist, the conditions for the two remaining outcomes have to cover
the interval (0,+∞). As shown in the Appendix, the outcome (winner, loser) is an equilibrium when ξT is
higher than the left-hand side in the multiple-equilibria condition (18), while (loser, winner) is an equilibrium
when ξT is lower than the right-hand side in (18). Hence, if (18) is satisﬁed, for every ξT ∈ (0,+∞) at least
one of the two outcomes is an equilibrium. In the region where ξT is between the left- and right-hand side of
(18), any of the two outcomes can occur in equilibrium, giving rise to multiple equilibria. The condition for
uniqueness where the performance threshold η is above a certain critical value (17) admits the outcome (loser,
loser) for some states ξT. It turns out that in this case the regions corresponding to the three equilibrium
outcomes cover all possible states of the world and do not overlap. Hence, a unique equilibrium occurs.
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(a) α = 0.7,η = 1.05
¯ γ1
¯ γ2





(b) α = 0.7,η = 1.1
¯ γ1
¯ γ2





(c) α = 1,η = 1.05
¯ γ1
¯ γ2





(d) α = 1,η = 1.1
¯ γ1
¯ γ2





(e) α = 1.3,η = 1.05
¯ γ1
¯ γ2





(f) α = 1.3,η = 1.1
Figure 2: Unique Nash equilibrium. The ﬁlled area corresponds to the pairs of man-
agers’ intrinsic risk aversions (¯ γ1, ¯ γ2) for which the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
occurs. The ﬂow elasticity α increases as we go down the plots. The relative performance
threshold η increases as we go from the left to the right.
obtains. Given the convoluted nature of conditions for uniqueness and multiplicity, (17) and
(18), we investigate when they are likely to be satisﬁed numerically.
Figure 2 depicts the values of the managers’ intrinsic risk aversions, ¯ γ1 and ¯ γ2, for which
the unique equilibrium occurs, i.e. when (17) is satisﬁed. For a given ﬂow elasticity α and
performance threshold η, the unique equilibrium is likely to exist for higher values of the risk
aversions. The reason is that in states of the world when both managers are losers, high risk
aversions prevent each manager from gambling that would destroy the equilibrium. As we
have just discussed, increasing the performance threshold η works against both non-existence
17¯ γ1
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(a) α = 0.7,η = 1
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(b) α = 0.7,η = 1.05
¯ γ1
¯ γ2





(c) α = 0.7,η = 1.1
¯ γ1
¯ γ2





(d) α = 1,η = 1
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¯ γ2





(e) α = 1,η = 1.05
¯ γ1
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(f) α = 1,η = 1.1
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(g) α = 1.3,η = 1
¯ γ1
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(h) α = 1.3,η = 1.05
¯ γ1
¯ γ2





(i) α = 1.3,η = 1.1
Figure 3: Multiple Nash Equilibria. The ﬁlled area corresponds to the pairs of man-
agers’ intrinsic risk aversions (¯ γ1,¯ γ2) for which multiple Nash equilibria obtain. The ﬂow
elasticity α increases as we go down the plots. The performance threshold η increases as we
go from the left to the right.
and multiplicity, hence the region (¯ γ1, ¯ γ2) where the unique equilibrium exists expands when
η increases, as seen by comparing the right panels to the left ones in Figure 2. Finally,
increasing the ﬂow elasticity α (moving from the top to bottom plots in Figure 2) ampliﬁes
the incentives to gamble for both managers, leading to a smaller region of (¯ γ1, ¯ γ2) for which
the equilibrium exists.
Figure 3 plots the values of the managers’ intrinsic risk aversions for which multiple
equilibria occur, i.e., when (18) is satisﬁed. When the performance threshold is low – plots
18(a), (d), (g) on the left – multiple equilibria obtain provided that the risk aversions are
not very diﬀerent, so that the winner’s outperformance margin is consistent with the loser’s
underperformance margin. As the ﬂow elasticity increases, moving from plot (a) down to
(g), the gambling behavior becomes more pronounced, and so the set of risk aversions for
which equilibria obtain shrinks. As the performance threshold η increases, we get the unique
equilibrium for high risk aversions, as depicted in Figure 2. Hence, we no longer have multiple
equilibria in the region of high risk aversion, as evident in Figure 3, plots (c), (f), and (i)
on the right. Finally, we note that increasing the ﬂow elasticity α has a larger eﬀect when
the performance threshold is low (plots (a), (d), and (g)) than when the threshold is high
(plots (c), (f), and (i)). This is explained by recalling that the non-existence arises when both
managers are in the convex region and cannot agree on who the winner is. If the threshold
η is high, only one manager can be in her risk-shifting region in a given state. For example,
manager 1 is in her risk-shifting region when her relative performance R1T is close to η,
meaning that the relative performance of manager 2, R2T = 1/R1T, is close to 1/η, which
is far from her gambling level η when η is high. As a result, increasing the ﬂow elasticity α
has little impact on the existence of equilibrium when η is high.
Given the novelty of our results pertaining to multiplicity and non-existence within a
standard workhorse asset allocation framework, it is natural to address their robustness. In
parallel work, we investigate a strategic game among money managers in a similar setting but
when local convexities are absent and show that a pure-strategy equilibrium always obtains
and is unique. Hence, the key assumption that leads to multiplicity and non-existence is the
convexity of the ﬂow-performance relationship, and consequently the local convexities in the
managers’ objective functions. As discussed earlier, there is extensive empirical literature
supporting this assumption.
Remark 1. Low performance threshold, η < 1. While in our setting the assumption that
the performance threshold η is higher than or equal to unity seems justiﬁed (see discussion
of investor inertia in Section 2.2), it is possible to envision settings in which the threshold
is lower than one. For example, Murphy (1999) documents that the prevalent executive
compensation contract in the U.S. is the so called 80/120 plan, whereby the manager receives
a ﬁxed base salary plus a bonus if her performance exceeds 80% of a pre-speciﬁed performance
standard. If we take an industry with a few large companies, it may well be that the
CEOs of these companies behave strategically, and our framework could be applied once the
performance threshold is set at 0.8. It turns out the condition for multiplicity (18) equally
applies to this case. However, unlike the case of η > 1, unique equilibrium is not possible.
When η drops below a certain value, (18) is no longer satisﬁed and the equilibrium does
not exist. To understand why low performance threshold leads to non-existence, we note
that there emerges an additional outcome when both managers are winners. In this (winner,
winner) outcome, both managers’ objective functions are augmented by relative concerns,
19and so each manager’s actions aﬀect the other’s marginal utility. This imposes an additional
restriction on the managers’ behavior, as compared to the case η > 1, where we always
have at least one loser whose marginal utility is not aﬀected by the winner’s actions. This
restriction leads to the non-existence of equilibrium.
5. Equilibrium Investment Policies and Properties
In this Section, we describe the (possibly multiple) equilibrium policies and investigate their
properties. When a pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist, it is likely that the managers
will resort to mixed strategies. Given that our strategy space is inﬁnite-dimensional, it
appears that characterizing mixed-strategy equilibrium can be done only numerically, and
so is left for future research.
5.1. Characterization of Unique Equilibrium
We start with the case of the unique equilibrium that admits a more comprehensive analysis.
Proposition 3 fully characterizes the unique investment policies and horizon wealth proﬁles.
Proposition 3. Assume the condition for the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilib-
rium (17) is satisﬁed. The equilibrium investment policy of manager 1, φ∗
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,
yi > 0 solves E[ξTW ∗
iT] = Wi0, and W ∗
1t is given in the Appendix. The equilibrium portfolio
policy of manager 2, φ∗
2t, is as in (21) with subscripts 1 and 2 switched.
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We ﬁrst look at the managers’ equilibrium horizon wealth. Figure 4 plots the equilibrium
(latter part of Proposition 3), as well as the normal wealth proﬁles, as a function of the state
price density ξT. From Figure 4(a), in good states (low ξT), the less risk averse manager 2
has a higher equilibrium wealth than manager 1, in line with the normal wealth proﬁles as
depicted in Figure 4(b). In these states, manager 1 is a loser and manager 2 is a winner,
getting the money ﬂows. As we move into intermediate states (middle-ξT region), manager
2’s relative performance decreases, and after hitting her minimum outperformance margin ¯ η2,
jumps down as manager 2 optimally becomes a loser, no longer getting any ﬂows. Finally, as
economic conditions deteriorate (high ξT), manager 1’s relative performance increases, and
after reaching the maximum underperformance margin η
1, it jumps upwards as manager 1
becomes a winner and receives money ﬂows. From the viewpoint of potential fund investors,
Figure 4 illustrates the importance of accounting for the managers’ relative performance
concerns. The eﬀect is most pronounced in good and bad states, where the presence of
strategic interactions strongly ampliﬁes the diﬀerence between the returns on the managers’
portfolios.
Turning to the equilibrium investment policies, we ﬁrst investigate the managers’ behavior
in the deep outperformance and underperformance regions at an interim point in time t < T.
Corollary 1 characterizes the managers’ limiting behavior in the interim bad (high ξt) and
good (low ξt) states, henceforth referred to as the interim (winner, loser) and (loser, winner)
regions, respectively.














(b) Normal horizon wealth proﬁles
W1T,W2T
ξT
Figure 4: Managers’ unique equilibrium horizon wealth. Equilibrium and normal
horizon wealth proﬁles for the more risk averse manager 1 (solid plots) and the more risk
tolerant manager 2 (dashed plots). The plots are typical.
cies of managers 1 and 2, φ∗
1(∞) = limξt→∞ φ∗
1(ξt) and φ∗






















In the interim (loser, winner) region, the limiting equilibrium investment policies of managers
1 and 2, φ∗
1(0) = limξt→0 φ∗
1(ξt) and φ∗






















Consequently, the directions in which the managers’ limiting equilibrium policies deviate from



















where manager i’s normal policy is φN
i = (σ⊤)−1κ/¯ γi.
Equations (22)–(23) of Corollary 1 reveal that when outperforming, the direction in which
manager i adjusts her policy from the normal due to strategic interaction is determined by
whether she is a chaser (¯ γi > 1) or a contrarian (¯ γi < 1), and whether her normal policy
exceeds the opponent’s normal policy or not. In particular, if manager i is a chaser, she
moves her investment policy from the normal towards the normal policy of the opponent.
On the other hand, if manager i is a contrarian, she tilts her investment policy away from the
opponent’s normal. These implications can be understood by recalling our earlier discussion
22of the chasing and contrarian behavior in the presence of relative performance concerns.
For example, consider the case where manager 1 is a chaser (¯ γ1 > 1) while manager 2 is
a contrarian (¯ γ2 < 1). Here, the normal policy of the more risk averse manager 1 is less
risky than that of the more risk tolerant manager 2, φN
1 < φN
2 . Being a chaser, manager 1
moves her policy towards the normal policy of manager 2, leading to a higher than normal
risk exposure, as predicted by (22). Manager 2 is a contrarian and so moves her policy away
from the normal policy of manager 1, leading to a higher than normal risk exposure, as
implied by (23).
To best highlight the managers’ overall asset allocation behavior, Figure 5 plots managers’
equilibrium investments (equation (21)) as a function of manager 1’s relative performance
at time t, R1t = W1t/W2t, with a relatively high R1t (> η) corresponding to the interim
(winner, loser) region and a relatively low R1t (< 1/η) to the interim (loser, winner) region.
For expositional clarity, we specialize the economy to feature two risky stocks, 1 and 2, and








where ρ is the correlation between stock 1 and 2 returns. Here, the market prices of risk are
κ1 = ( 1 − r)/σ1 and κ2 = [( 2 − r)/σ2 − ρ( 1 − r)/σ1]/
 
1 − ρ2. For the parameter values
in Figure 5, stock 1 is the more favorable of the two stocks in the sense that the Sharpe ratio
of the stock 1 (( 1 − r)/σ1) is relatively high as compared to the Sharpe ratio of stock 2
(( 2 − r)/σ2). As a result, both managers tend to invest a larger share of wealth in stock 1
than in stock 2. Apart from this, the proﬁles of the equilibrium investments in stocks 1 and
2 are similar, as seen by comparing the left panels of Figure 5, (a) and (c), with the right
panels, (b) and (d). Hence, in our discussion we focus only on the equilibrium investments
in stock 1 (Figure 5(a), (c)).
Figure 5(a) corresponds to the case when both managers are chasers. In the interim
(winner, loser) region manager 1 chases manager 2, which from Corollary 1 implies that
manager 1 increases her risk exposure as compared to normal and moves her policy towards
manager 2’s normal policy. For manager 2, the relative performance concerns are weak in
the interim (winner, loser) region since the likelihood of attracting money ﬂows at year-end
is low. As a result, the equilibrium policy of manager 2 is close to her normal policy. In the
interim (loser, winner) region, manager 2, a chaser, decreases her risk exposure relative to
normal as she tilts her investment policy towards manager 1’s normal policy. The equilibrium
policy of manager 1 is close to normal since the eﬀect of relative performance concerns is
small. In Figure 5(c), manager 1 is a chaser but manager 2 is a contrarian. In the interim
(winner, loser) region, the outcome of the strategic interaction is as in Figure 5(a): manager
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(d) Less favorable stock 2
Figure 5: The managers’ unique equilibrium investment policies. The time-t in-
vestment policies of the more risk averse manager 1 (solid lines) and the more risk tolerant
manager 2 (dashed lines) in stock 1 and stock 2. In each panel, the lower dotted line is the
normal policy of manager 1 φN
1 = (σ⊤)−1κ/¯ γ1, the upper dotted line is the normal policy of
manager 2 φN
2 = (σ⊤)−1κ/¯ γ2. Stock 1 is more favorable than stock 2 as it has a relatively
higher Sharpe ratio. In panels (a) and (b), the two managers are chasers, and the param-
eter values are: r = 0.05, 1 = 0.1, 2 = 0.12,σ1 = 0.15,σ2 = 0.3,ρ = 0.3,¯ γ1 = 4,¯ γ2 =
2,α = 1.5,η = 1.2,t = 0.8,T = 1, and hence θ = 0.6,γ1 = 8.5,γ2 = 3.5. In panels (c) and
(d), manager 1 is a chaser and manager 2 is a contrarian, and the parameter values are:
¯ γ1 = 2,¯ γ2 = 0.5,α = 0.3,η = 1.35,t = 0.95, and hence θ = 0.23,γ1 = 2.3,γ2 = 0.35, and the
remaining parameters are as in panels (a) and (b).
1 increases her risk exposure while manager 2 chooses a policy close to her normal. In the
interim (loser, winner) region, Corollary 1 implies that manager 2, a contrarian, increases
her risk exposure relative to the normal as she moves her policy away from the manager 1’s
normal policy. For manager 1, the eﬀect of relative considerations is weak and so she chooses
a policy close to the normal.
In the interim (loser, loser) region, the economic mechanism underlying the chasing and
contrarian behavior is dominated by the gambling incentives as each manager is in the convex
24region of her (conditional) objective function. Hence, the behavior of managers in this region
is similar in Figures 5(a) and (c). Each manager gambles in order to avoid a situation where
her relative performance is close to the threshold level, which is achieved by following a
policy that is suﬃciently diﬀerent from that of the opponent. As a result, the managers
always gamble in the opposite directions from each other in each individual stock. The more
risk averse manager 1 optimally decreases her stock holding when gambling while the more
risk tolerant manager 2 gambles by increasing hers, as seen in Figures 5(a) and (c).15
5.2. Eﬀects of Stock Correlation on Unique Equilibrium
Figure 6 illustrates the impact of the correlation between the two stocks, ρ, on the man-
agers’ equilibrium investment policies. Several noteworthy features arise. First, changing
the correlation can aﬀect the equilibrium policies in a non-monotonic way, as in Figures
6(a)-(c), as well as monotonically, as in Figure 6(d). Second, Figures 6(a) and (b) reveal
that the equilibrium investment proﬁles may cross for diﬀerent values of correlation. Third,
as correlation increases the direction of humps in the interim (loser, loser) region can invert,
as depicted in Figures 6(b) and (d).
Above rich patterns arise due to the interaction of a diversiﬁcation eﬀect, the extent of
beneﬁts to diversiﬁcation, and a substitution eﬀect, the extent of the two stocks acting as
a substitute to each other. The diversiﬁcation eﬀect dominates for low correlation values,
while the substitution eﬀect dominates for high values of correlation. When the correlation
is low, both sources of stock return uncertainty matter considerably and so the two stocks
compliment each other by providing a hedge against a speciﬁc source of risk. Increasing the
correlation reduces the diversiﬁcation beneﬁts from holding a portfolio of the two stocks,
leading the managers to reduce their investments in both stocks. When the correlation is
high, the two stocks become close substitutes, in which case the more favorable stock 1 (with
a relatively high Sharpe ratio) becomes the primary security through which the managers
achieve their desired risk exposures. As the correlation increases further, the managers
substitute away from the less favorable stock 2 (with a relatively low Sharpe ratio) into the
more favorable stock 1.
Going back to Figure 6, when the correlation increases from −0.25 to 0.3 (moving from
the dotted to dashed lines in all panels of Figure 6), the diversiﬁcation eﬀect dominates
and both managers reduce their investments in each stock across all three regions of interim
15We note that mutual fund managers are often not allowed to go short, while according to Figure 5 it
may be optimal for a manager to short risky assets in a certain range of interim relative performance. For
tractability, we do not explicitly introduce a no-short-sale constraint. We believe that incorporating such a
constraint is not going to signiﬁcantly change our main insights, because if the constraint were present, it
would likely lead to less pronounced gambling by the more risk averse manager in the relevant range of the
interim relative performance.
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Figure 6: Eﬀect of stock correlation on the managers’ unique equilibrium in-
vestment policies. The managers’ time-t equilibrium policies for varying levels of the
correlation, ρ, between stock 1 and 2 returns. In all panels, dotted line corresponds to
ρ = −0.25, dashed line to ρ = 0.3, solid line to ρ = 0.85. The other parameter values are as
in Figure 5(a) and (b).
relative performance.16 As the correlation rises further from ρ = 0.3 to ρ = 0.85 (moving
from dashed to solid lines in Figure 6), in the interim (winner, loser) and (loser, winner)
regions the substitution eﬀect induces the managers to increase their investments in the more
favorable stock 1 and to ﬁnance this by decreasing their holdings in the less favorable stock
2. Hence, the substitution eﬀect works in the opposite direction from the diversiﬁcation
eﬀect for stock 1, leading the equilibrium policies to being non-monotonic in the correlation
(Figures 6(a) and (c)). In the interim (loser, loser) region, the more risk averse manager 1
gambles by decreasing her risk exposure. Since the more favorable stock 1 is the primary
16While not explicitly highlighted in Figure 6, we note that the intensity of the chasing behavior, as
measured by the magnitude of the deviation of the equilibrium policy from normal, is also reduced with the
increase in correlation. The reason is that the managers’ normal policies are scaled down proportionally as
the correlation increases due to the diversiﬁcation eﬀect, and so the absolute diﬀerence between them, which
aﬀects the intensity of chasing, decreases.
26means to changing her risk exposure, the downward hump becomes more pronounced, as
seen in Figure 6(a). The substitution eﬀect implies that this decrease in stock 1 holdings
is mirrored by an increase in the less favorable stock 2 holdings. This leads to the inverted
shape of the equilibrium policy for stock 2, as depicted in Figure 6(b). The more risk tolerant
manager 2 follows the opposite strategy to that of manager 1 and gambles by increasing her
risk exposure. Consequently, the size of the upward hump in the primary stock 1 holdings
increases (Figure 6(c)). This larger position in stock 1 is ﬁnanced by a decrease in the less
favorable stock 2 holdings, leading to the inverted hump in Figure 6(d).17
Having fully described the unique equilibrium investment policies of the managers in a
strategic setting, we may now compare our results to those obtained in frameworks where a
manager competes against an exogenous benchmark (Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro (2007),
Carpenter (2000)). The main similarity between our work and non-strategic studies is the
presence of the gambling behavior in one of the three interim regions of our unique equilib-
rium and their optimal investment policies. On the other hand, there are several important
diﬀerences. First, strategic interactions can lead to non-existence or multiplicity of equilib-
rium, as we have elaborated on in Section 4. Second, the economic mechanism behind the
chasing and contrarian behavior, which drives the equilibrium policies in the interim (win-
ner, loser) and (loser, winner) regions, is not present in Basak et al. or Carpenter. Third,
in the interim (loser, loser) region, where the gambling behavior prevails, the two managers
always gamble in the opposite direction from each other in each individual stock, and it is
the manager’s risk aversion relative to that of the opponent that determines the direction
of gambling. This is notably diﬀerent from Basak et al., where for given market parameter
values the direction of gambling is determined by the absolute value of the manager’s risk
aversion. In Carpenter, the direction of gambling is always the same. Fourth, by considering
a setting with multiple correlated risky stocks we uncover novel patterns of the managers’
behavior for varying levels of correlation.
5.3. Characterization of Multiple Equilibria
We now turn to the case of multiple equilibria, which obtains under the multiplicity condition
(18). Proposition 4 provides the full characterization of all horizon wealth proﬁles that can
occur in equilibrium.18
17Given that the managers care about the overall risk of their portfolios and that they are heterogeneous in
their risk preferences, one could have expected that the mechanism that leads to the shape inversion does not
necessarily kick in simultaneously for the two managers. However as discussed earlier, the managers always
gamble strategically against each other in the opposite direction in each individual stock. So, manager 1
optimally inverts her equilibrium policy in the less favorable stock 2 if and only if manager 2 inverts hers,
reﬂecting the strategic nature of the managers’ interaction.
18Due to the nature of multiplicity, describing the corresponding investment policies is not straightfor-
ward. Loosely, the number of terms in the expressions for equilibrium policies depend on the number of
27Proposition 4. Assume the condition for the multiplicity of Nash equilibrium (18) is sat-
isﬁed. The equilibrium outcomes and horizon wealth proﬁles (W ∗
1T, W ∗
1T) are as follows.
When ξ
¯ γ1−¯ γ2
T > y min
 
Bη−¯ γ1¯ γ2,Dη¯ γ1(γ2+θ(γ2−1) 
, the managers are in (winner, loser) and
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outcomes, (winner, loser) and (loser, winner), can occur in equilibrium. Here, the constants




















Figure 7: Managers’ multiple equilibrium horizon wealth. Multiple equilibrium
horizon wealth proﬁles of the more risk averse manager 1 (solid plot) and the more risk
tolerant manager 2 (dashed plot). The plots are typical.
Figure 7 plots the multiple equilibrium wealth proﬁles. Looking at Figures 4 and 7, we
observe that the multiple equilibrium wealth proﬁles and the unique ones diﬀer only in the
middle-ξT region. When the equilibrium is unique, both managers are losers in the middle
region, choosing similar horizon wealth proﬁles (Figure 4). Now, since the performance
threshold is relatively low, such wealth proﬁles are no longer optimal as both managers have
incentives to gamble. So, one of the managers must be a winner, implying that her wealth will
be considerably higher than the other manager’s wealth, preventing the latter from gambling.
As discussed in Section 4, in some states the managers are indiﬀerent to switching their
rankings. Since now the rankings are diﬀerent in all states, with neither (winner, winner)
discontinuities in the horizon wealth proﬁles, which can be inﬁnite.
28nor (loser, loser) outcomes being possible, switching rankings leads to multiple equilibria.
Unlike the middle region, when ξT is either relatively low or high, the diﬀerence between
the managers’ wealth levels is substantial in the unique equilibrium (Figure 4). So, even
with a low performance threshold η neither of the two managers has incentives to gamble
in these regions, leading to the multiple equilibria wealth proﬁles being the same as the
unique-equilibrium ones, as seen by comparing Figures 4 and 7.
A natural question is whether we can narrow down the set of multiple equilibria and rule
out some that are not likely to occur in the real world. While an in-depth investigation of this
issue is beyond the scope of this paper, we may put forward the following simple selection
criterion. Since real-life money managers incur trading costs, which we have abstracted away
from for tractability, the managers would favor the equilibrium with the minimal swings in
investments so as to minimize the transaction costs. Since the most pronounced swings are
associated with discontinuities in horizon wealth proﬁles, a natural selection criterion is to
pick an equilibrium with the minimum number of the discontinuities, which in our setting
amounts to the equilibrium with just one discontinuity. Indeed, inspecting Figure 7 we
observe that such an equilibrium is obtained by dividing the middle-ξT multiplicity region
into two parts, with (loser, winner) outcome occurring in the left part and (winner, loser)
outcome occurring in the right part. One can easily see that the structure of the resulting
equilibrium wealth proﬁles is similar to that obtained in the unique equilibrium (Proposition
3), and so the investment policies underlying this selected equilibrium have the same proﬁle
as the unique equilibrium investment policies depicted in Figure 4.
Remark 2. Interim Performance. Starting from the study by Brown, Harlow, and Starks
(1996), it has become common in both theoretical and empirical works to consider the
interim performance as a pertinent factor that aﬀects risk taking incentives in tournament
settings. In our analysis, we can easily accommodate this factor in by introducing an interim
performance parameter, R10 > 1, which gives manager 1 an initial advantage. The time-
t performance of manager 1 is now given by R10W1t/W10. As a result, manager 1 and
2’s relative performances become R10R1t and R2t/R10, respectively, where as before R1t =
W1t/W2t and R2t = W2t/W1t. In Figures 5–6, we simply need to put manager 1’s new
relative performance in place of R1t. Alternatively, if one wants to keep the old ones, the
graphs should be appropriately scaled along the x-axis by a factor of R10. All our results
pertaining to equilibrium existence and multiplicity remain unchanged, and so Figures 2–3
are not aﬀected. This is in contrast to a static risk-neutral setting where the diﬀerence in
the managers’ interim performance is found to be critical for the existence of a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium (Taylor (2003)). The only additional implication of the introduction of
interim performance is the possibility of a new equilibrium, in which manager 1 is a winner
at the horizon T with certainty, across all states. We do not present this analysis since such
an equilibrium can only occur in a knife-edge case when both managers have identical risk
29aversions.
Remark 3. Managers with diﬀerent initial wealth. If the managers’ initial wealth are dif-
ferent, the expressions for best responses in Proposition 1 are augmented by the ratio of the
initial wealths. However, all the subsequent results pertaining to equilibrium are virtually
unchanged. In particular, the conditions for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium are
unaﬀected (Proposition 2), and the structures of the unique and multiple equilibria and the
shapes of the unique equilibrium investment policies are preserved (Propositions 3–4). The
reason is that the fund ﬂows are driven by relative returns, and changing initial wealth does
not give a manager any kind of advantage or disadvantage in the competition for fund ﬂows.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium portfolios of money managers in presence of strate-
gic interactions driven by relative performance concerns with local convexities. We discover
the possibility of three distinct results: multiple equilibria, unique equilibrium, or no equi-
librium at all. When the equilibrium is unique, we analyze the properties of the equilibrium
investment policies. In the other two cases, we elaborate on the underlying economic mecha-
nisms that lead to non-existence or multiplicity, most of which are driven by the risk shifting
incentives combined with the strategic interaction of the managers.
Given the novelty of our analysis, we believe there are various promising directions for
future research. While we assume that money managers have a perfect knowledge of each
other’s attitude towards risk, it would be valuable to investigate a perfect Bayesian equi-
librium in a more realistic framework where the managers do not have such knowledge but
can learn about each other’s traits by observing the investment policies. It would also be
of interest to extend our framework to investigate the possible strategic interactions among
CEOs, whose contracts often include a bonus part for high relative performance (Murphy
(1999)). Considering a setting where managers compete against each other and at the same
time against an exogenous peer-group benchmark could be an interesting generalization. An-
other natural extension of our framework would be to incorporate ﬂow-performance relations
where money ﬂows depend on discrete rankings, leading to discontinuities of the managers’
objective functions. Finally, analyzing the case when the investment opportunities of the
managers are not perfectly correlated would be worthwhile.
30Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Employing martingale methods, given the CRRA preferences (5),
manager i’s optimal time-T ′ wealth proﬁle ˆ WiT′ is given by the ﬁrst order condition
ˆ WiT′ = (yiTξT′)
−1/¯ γi, (A1)
where yiT > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier attached to her time-T static budget constraint
ET[ξT′ ˆ WiT′] = ξTWiTfT. The Lagrange multiplier is found by substituting (A1) into the


















Combining (6) and (A3) yields the time-T indirect utility function
viT ≡ ET[ui( ˆ WiT′)] =
1






Since ξt follows a geometric Brownian motion with constant drift and volatility, we have that
ET[ξ
1−1/¯ γi
T′ ] = aξ
1−1/¯ γi
T where a is some constant depending on r,κ, and T ′−T, and we drop it
without loss of generality since it does not aﬀect the optimal behavior. Finally, substituting
the expectation into (A4), we get
viT =
1
1 − ¯ γi
(WiTfT)
1−¯ γi. (A5)
The indirect utility function (6) follows by plugging the ﬂow-performance function into (A5)
after some manipulation. The stated properties of θ and γi are immediate.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1. We consider only manager 1; for manager 2 the analysis is
analogous. Fixing the horizon wealth proﬁle of manager 2, W2T(ξT), we look for the manager
1’s optimal horizon wealth proﬁle ˆ W1T. Although manager 1’s objective function has a region
of local convexity, we can still use standard optimization techniques once we concavify the
objective function (see Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro (2007) for a more formal proof in a
similar setting). Concaviﬁcation involves ﬁnding the range [W, W] and the coeﬃcients a
and b1 such that replacing v1( ) within the range [W, W] with a chord a+b1W1T will result
31in a globally concave objective function. Noting that the chord must be tangent to v1( ) at
W and W, we have the following system of equations to solve for:





a + b1W =
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where we have dropped k1−¯ γ1 from the objective function since it does not aﬀect the opti-
mization problem. Subtracting (A6) from (A7) yields
b1(W − W) =
1








Expressing W and W in terms of b1 and W2 (from (A8)) and plugging into (A9) gives
b1(b
−1/γ1





















which after some algebra yields the boundary function (16). If y1ξT is higher that the slope
of the concaviﬁcation line b1, the optimal wealth is to the left from W, i.e., manager 1 chooses
to be a loser and her normal-type policy (12) obtains. Otherwise, she becomes a winner and
(13) obtains, accounting for relative concerns.
Manager 1’s relative performance is closest to the threshold ηW2T when she is indiﬀerent
between being a winner and a loser, i.e., when
y1ξT = b1(ηW2T) = (1 + α)
¯ γ1/θ (¯ γ1/γ1)
¯ γ1γ1/(γ1−¯ γ1) (ηW2T)
−¯ γ1. (A10)
If manager 1 chooses to be a winner, her “minimum outperformance margin” ¯ η1 is obtained
by plugging (A10) into (13) and dividing the resulting wealth by W2T. This yields




¯ γ1/θ (¯ γ1/γ1)





= (1 + α)
(1−¯ γ1/θ)/γ1 (¯ γ1/γ1)
−¯ γ1/(γ1−¯ γ1) (ηW2T)
(¯ γ1+θ(γ1−1))/γ1/W2T
= (1 + α)
−1/α (¯ γ1/γ1)
−¯ γ1/(γ1−¯ γ1) η,
where in the last equality we use (7)–(8) to simplify the expressions. If manager 1 chooses to
be a loser, her “maximum underperformance margin” η
1 is obtained by substituting (A10)





¯ γ1/θ (¯ γ1/γ1)
¯ γ1γ1/(γ1−¯ γ1) (ηW2T)
−¯ γ1
 −1/¯ γ1
/W2T = (1 + α)
−1/θ (¯ γ1/γ1)
−¯ γ1/(γ1−¯ γ1) η.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. For a given realization of ξT, we can have one of the three
outcomes: (winner, loser), (loser, winner), or (loser, loser). From the best responses (12)–
(15), we can determine the regions of ξT for which these outcomes can occur.
(winner, loser). From (13), manager 1 chooses to be a winner if y1ξT ≤ b1(ηW2T). Plugging
manager 2’s wealth, given by (14) as she is a loser, and using the deﬁnition of b1( ) (16),
yields
y1ξT ≤ (1 + α)
¯ γ1/θ (¯ γ1/γ1)













¯ γ1/θ (¯ γ1/γ1)
¯ γ1γ1/(γ1−¯ γ1)
 − ¯ γ2
η
¯ γ1¯ γ2 ≡ yAη
¯ γ1¯ γ2, (A11)




2 and A is as given in (19).
From (13), manager 2 chooses to be a loser if y2ξT > b2(ηW1T). Plugging manager 1’s
wealth W1T, given in (13), and expanding b2 yields
y2ξT > (1 + α)
¯ γ2/θ (¯ γ2/γ2)












2 (1 + α)
γ1¯ γ2/θ−¯ γ2 (¯ γ2/γ2)
γ1γ2¯ γ2/(γ2−¯ γ2) η
−¯ γ2(γ1+θ(γ1−1)) ≡ yCη
−¯ γ2(γ1+θ(γ1−1)),
(A12)
where C is as given in (20). The outcome (winner, loser) can occur provided that both (A11)
and (A12) are satisﬁed, which means ξT satisﬁes:
ξ
¯ γ1−¯ γ2






(loser, winner). The expressions are obtained from (A11) and (A12) by switching sub-
scripts 1 and 2, leading to the conditions on ξ
¯ γ2−¯ γ1
T . For ease of comparison with (winner,
















−¯ γ1¯ γ2 ≡ yBη







2 (1 + α)
¯ γ1−γ2¯ γ1/θ (¯ γ1/γ1)
−γ2γ1¯ γ1/(γ1−¯ γ1) η
¯ γ1(γ2+θ(γ2−1)) ≡ yDη
¯ γ1(γ2+θ(γ2−1)),
where B and D are given by (19) and (20), respectively. Combining the two conditions,
33(loser, winner) can occur for ξT satisfying
ξ
¯ γ1−¯ γ2






(loser, loser). The conditions for this outcome follow from the observation that manager
i wants to be a loser in those states in which she does not want to be a winner. Hence,
manager 1 wants to be a loser for ξT such that (A11) is not satisﬁed. Similarly, manager 2
chooses to be a loser when (A14) does not hold. So, (loser, loser) can occur for ξT given by
yBη
−¯ γ1¯ γ2 < ξ
¯ γ1−¯ γ2
T < yAη
¯ γ1¯ γ2. (A16)
Inspection of (A13), (A15), and (A16) reveals that if (loser, loser) region is not empty,
i.e., if
Bη
−¯ γ1¯ γ2 < Aη
¯ γ1¯ γ2, (A17)
the three regions can never overlap, meaning that multiple equilibria are not possible. For
the unique equilibrium to exist, i.e., for the three regions to fully cover the interval (0,+∞),
it must be the case that
Aη
¯ γ1¯ γ2 ≥ Cη
−¯ γ2(γ1+θ(γ1−1)),Bη
−¯ γ1¯ γ2 ≤ Dη
¯ γ2(γ2+θ(γ2−1)), (A18)
in which case the unique equilibrium has the following structure. (winner, loser) occurs for
ξ
¯ γ1−¯ γ2
T > yAη¯ γ1¯ γ2, (loser, loser) for yBη−¯ γ1¯ γ2 ≤ ξ
¯ γ1−¯ γ2
T ≤ yAη¯ γ1¯ γ2, and (loser, winner) for
ξ
¯ γ1−¯ γ2
T < yBη−¯ γ1¯ γ2. Combining (A17) and (A18) yields the condition for the existence and
uniqueness of equilibrium (17).
If (loser, loser) region is empty, i.e., if (A17) is not satisﬁed, then for an equilibrium to
exist it must be the case that the remaining two outcomes fully cover (0,+∞). Hence, from
(A13) and (A15), we get the multiple equilibria condition (18). In a knife-edge case when
(18) holds as an equality, the equilibrium is unique. In this case, (winner, loser) occurs for
ξT satisfying (A13), (loser, winner) occurs for the other ξT. In all other cases, when (18)
holds as a strict inequality, multiple equilibria obtains. The structure of the equilibria is as
follows. (winner, loser) occurs for ξ
¯ γ1−¯ γ2
T > y min
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is consistent with both (winner, loser) and (loser, winner) outcomes, hence for such ξT we
get the multiplicity of equilibria with these two outcomes. Other structures of equilibrium
are not possible, hence there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium if neither (17) nor (18) is
34satisﬁed.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. From Proposition 2, an equilibrium exists and is unique if the
uniqueness condition (17) is satisﬁed. In the proof of Proposition 2, we have established
the structure of the managers’ equilibrium wealth proﬁles – for each realization of ξT we
identiﬁed whether manager i, i = 1,2, is a winner or a loser. We now determine the
associated equilibrium horizon wealth proﬁles corresponding to these two outcomes. Focusing
on manager 1, from (12) her optimal wealth is (y1ξT)−1/¯ γ1 when she is a loser, i.e., when
ξ
¯ γ1−¯ γ2
T ≤ yAη¯ γ1¯ γ2. Otherwise, when ξ
¯ γ1−¯ γ2
T > yAη¯ γ1¯ γ2, manager 1 is a winner, and her best
response wealth is given in (13). As the performance threshold η is greater than one, manager
2 is a loser whenever manager 1 is a winner, and so in equilibrium chooses W ∗
2T = (y2ξT)−1/¯ γ2.












To derive the associated equilibrium investment policy of manager 1, φ∗
1t, we ﬁrst de-
termine the time-t value of the equilibrium wealth W ∗
1t. Since ξtW ∗















where β and ˜ y1 are as deﬁned in Proposition 3. To evaluate the two conditional expectations,
we use the following property of the truncated log-normal distribution. If x is a log-normally










Given that as of time t lnξT has mean lnξt −(r + κ 2/2)(T −t) and variance  κ 2(T −t),
applying (A20) to (A19) yields
W
∗




t + (1 − N(d(˜ γ,β)))˜ y1Z(˜ γ,t)ξ
−1/˜ γ
t , (A21)
where N,d,Z,˜ γ, ˜ y1 are as deﬁned in Proposition 3. From Itˆ o’s Lemma, the coeﬃcient of the
Brownian motion ω in the dynamic process for W ∗






where κj is the j-th component of the market price of risk vector κ. Equating each of these












Solving the system and substituting the derivative of (A21) with respect to ξt into the
solution yields manager 1’s equilibrium investment policy. For manager 2, the analysis is
analogous. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1. The limiting equilibrium policies of manager 1 is straightforwardly
obtained by letting ξt tend to 0 or ∞ in (21), and similarly for manager 2.
Substituting the equilibrium limiting policies into (22) and multiplying both parts by the





















Rearranging the argument of sgn( ) on the left-hand side of (A22) yields
¯ γ1¯ γ2 + ¯ γ1α(¯ γ1 − 1) − ¯ γ2(¯ γ1 + α(¯ γ1 − 1))
γ1¯ γ1¯ γ2
=














Since α and γ1 are positive, (A22) obtains. Switching subscripts 1 and 2 in (22) gives (23).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. In Proposition 2 we show that multiple equilibria occur if the
multiplicity condition (18) is satisﬁed. In the proof of Proposition 2, we describe the structure
of the multiple equilibria, i.e., the states in which outcome (winner, loser) or outcome (loser,
winner) occurs in equilibrium, and the states in which either of the two outcomes is possible.
In Proposition 3, we describe what horizon wealth manager i, i = 1,2, chooses in equilibrium
when she is a winner and when she is a loser. Combining the results of these two Propositions,
we obtain the horizon wealth proﬁles that can occur in the case of multiple equilibria.
Q.E.D.
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